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NOTES.
ACTIONS FOR DEATH IN TIE ADMIRALTY COURTS.

At common law there was no right of action for injuries to
the person resulting in death. The civil law doctrine, though
not entirely clear, seems to have been the same in the case of
a freeman.1
Nevertheless, for several centuries nearly all the
civilizations of the Continent of Europe have recognized the
right to recover for death and have applied the rule both to
casualties on land and at sea.2 To remedy this defect of the
'Ilublin v. X. 0. & C. R. R. Co., 6 La. Ann., 496.
Holmes v. 0. & C. R. R. Co., 5 Fed., 75.
*Hughes on Admiralty, sec. 11O.
[(;21

But see also
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cornumn law. Lord Canilbll's Acts was passed, and similar
.tatutes now exit in the various States of this Union. In Eng-

land; however, it has, after some divergence of opinion in the
courts, beenf settled that Lord Campl)ell's Act? does not apply
to actions in ren. for injuries occurring on the high seas or
within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty, and
also that no such right of action for death exists under the
general maritime law as in force in England.' For some time
the decisions in the various Federal courts were ia a hopeless
conflict, some holding that there was no right of action for
death under the general maritime law as in force in the United
States, and others holding that such an action brought by
the parent of the deceased would be entertained and recovery
allowed, even in the absence of a State statute.* In "The Harrisburg,"' however, the United States Supreme Court definitely
decided that the rule of the common law applied in the Admiralty, i. e., a recovery for death, was no part of our maritime
law. This decision has since been uniformly followed.
Congress has never passed an act providing for the bringing
of actions for injuries resulting in death, though it-would certainly seem to have this power. The right to recovery in such
cases being part of the general maritime law of the Continent
of Europe, it would seem a proper subject for assimilation into
our maritime law under the admiralty power granted the Federal Government in the Constitution.' It is, however, a well
established principle that a State statute so intended can give
a right in rein. enforceable in the Federal courts, provided that
such right is maritime in its nature; i. e., one over which the
Federal Admiralty Courts would have cognizance.' It therefore becomes important to examine the-various State statutes
to see whether or not-they give such a right of action. Statutes
modelled on Lord Campbell's Act$ have generally been held
'9 and ioVict., c. 93:
' Vera Cruz, ioApp. Cas., 59.
'The Sea Gull, Chase 145; The Highland Light, Chase iso; The
Mlanhassett, x8 Fed., qiR
119 U. S., Igg.
The Corsair, 145 U. S., 335; The Onoka, xo7-Fed., 94

'For a similar extension of the admiralty power of the Federal
Courts in conformity with the general maritime law of the Continent of
Europe compare the acts for the limitation of the liability of ship owners
(Act of Mfarch 3, x851; Sees. 4282-9 of the Revised Statutes of the
U. S.; Act of June 26, 1884: 23 Statutes at L.rge, 57; Act of June i9,
1886; 24 Statutes at Large, 8o).
' The Glide, 167 U. S., 66.
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to give no right inret. enforceable in the admiralty, and most
of the State statutes have been of this character,2 In a few
cases where a right in rein. has been specifically provided for,
it has been enforced in the Federal Courts."'
"The Corsair" 12 was a case where a libel in rein. was filed
against the Corsair for negligence causing the death of a passenger. The claim was based on the Louisiana code providing
for the bringing of actions for injuries resulting in death. The
injury in question occurred in Louisiana waters. The United
State Supreme Court held that the statute gave no right in rem.
but intimated that an action in personarn would have lain. In
Sherlock v. Ailing Is and Anzerican Steamship Co. v. Chase,"
actions in personam brought under a State statute providing
for a right of action for death were entertained and recovery
allowed in cases where the injury occurred within the waters
of the State giving the right of action. This distinction between
a suit in rein. and one in personani seems to have been followed
in the recent case of the Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Gilmore."
In that case the administrator of the deceased sued the owners
of the Hannibal for injuries resulting in death, caused by a
collision on the high seas between the Hannibal and the Saginaw-two vessels belonging to Delaware corporations. The
court (per Hoi.it_, J.) applied the well-known admiralty principle that a vessel is part of the territory of the country whose
flag she flies, and said that though the collision occurred on
the high seas, it in law took place within the State of Delaware,
both the vessels being owned by Delaware corporations, and
hence part of the soil of that State. The court enforced the
Delaware statute giving an action for death and allowed recovery.
"The Corsair, T45 U. S., 335; The Sylvan Glen, 9 Fed., 33s; The
Manhassett, 18 Fed., 918; The Onoka, io7 Fed., 984.

See Hughes on

Admiralty, p. 2og, note 6, for a complete list of the decisions on the
various state statutes.
'The Glendale, 77 Fed., 9o6; 8z Fed., 633, construing sec. 2902 of
the Virginia Code of z887.
n 145 U. S, 335-

"93 U. S., 99.

16 Wail, 5=2

"U. S. Supreme Court Reporter (Advance sheets for Jan. i, x908

p. 133). [Case decided Dec. 23, x9o7.1
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ATTACKING AN ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT BY MEANS OF THE WRIT

oF HABEAS CORPUS.

An interesting discussion of the scope of the writ of habeas
corpus, where it is sought to be used for the purpose of attacking an excessive or an erroneous judgment, is found in the
case of ex paric Burden, recently decided by the Supreme Court
of Mississippi, and reported in 45 Southcrp tiportcr z. Bhirden, the prisoner, had been indicted by the grand jury or
"assault with intent and in the attempt, to kill and murder,"
and the verdict of the trial jury was,-guilty of "assault and
battery with intent to commit manslaughter." The Circuit
Judge, interpreting the verdict as a conviction for a felony,
sentenced Burden to a term of six years in the penitentiary.
He appealed to the Supreme Court, and pending the appeal,
sued out a writ of habeas corpus before the Chancellor, allegivng
that the conviction was a Nullity, or at most a conviction for
assault and battery only, which was a misdemeanor and would
entitle him to release on bail. The Supreme Court, in a carefully worded opinion by the Chief Justice, WHITFIEL, allowed
the writ. They went ori the ground that, as there was no such
crime known to the laws of the State as that of which Burden
was convicted, the words "with intent to commit manslaughter"
must be treated as mere surplusage; that the Circuit Judge,
in failing'to do this and in sentencing the prisoner as for a
felony, had exceeded his jurisdiction, and that the writ of
habeas corpus will lie wherever a prisoner has been sentenced
in excess of the jurisdiction of the court. They held, however, that the sentence did not render the verdict a nullity,
and remanded the prisoner for a further commitment under
the verdict of assault and battery.
The particular distinction which the Court drew in this case
was that between a judgment erroneous in its essence, as this
was, and one merely successive, as for a period of time longer
than that permitted by statute. The former, they said, could
be attacked in this collateral manner, the latter, only directly
on appeal.
The question as to just when a court exceeds its jurisdiction
in the imposition of a sentence is one on which the courts have
differed decidedly. All have agreed that to sentence under a
verdict which does not conform to any known law is erroneous;
indeed, it was upon the authority of two earlier Mississippi
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cases to that effect that e.r parte Burden was decided.' But
it has long been quc.,tioned whether, when the court has undoubted jurisdiction of the person of the accused, and also of
the offence with which he is charged, a merely excessive sentence, one overstepping the statutory limit, will be held to have
been given without jurisdiction, so that the writ of habeas
corpus may be employed to attack it, or will be held to have
been a pure error and only assailable on appeal. A number
of courts have adhered to the latter view ;2 others have gone
to the opposite extreme and declared the judgment void ab
initio, and the prisoner discharged 3 -a lamentable failure of
justice because of a technicality-while still others (and these
seem to be in the majority) declare that only the excessive portion of the sentence is void, so that the prisoner may not be
released upon habeas corpus until he has served out the valid
period of his term. 4 "The prevailing rule is that an excessive
sentence is merely erroneous and voidable; that the whole sentence is not illegal and void because of the excess; that it is
not void ab initio, and that it is good on habeas corpus so far as
the power of the court extends, and invalid only as to the
excess." 3 The great New York case of The People cx rcl.
Tweed v. Viscomnb, 6o N. Y., 559 (1875), in which the notorious Tweed, after having been convicted on twelve counts and
sentenced separately under each, obtained his liberty after
serving the term prescribed for the first, follows this rule, as
does also the leading case in the United States Supreme Court,
ex parte Lange, 18 \Vallace, 163 (1873). H ence, the action of
the Court in the Burden case in remanding the prisoner for a
proper sentence, would seem to be sanctioned by the better
authority.
It is interesting to note certain other irregularities which have
been held to admit the remedy of habeas corpus. Where, for
example, a statute provides a punishment of fine or imprisonment, and the Court sentences the prisoner to fine and imprisonment, he will be dischargeable under this writ as soon as he
'Gipson v. State, 38 Miss., -95 (i86o); Traube v. State, 56 Miss., 153
(1878).
'In re Graham, 76 Wisconsin, 366 (i89o) Sennot's Case, z46 Mass.,
489 (1888).
'Ex paric Page, 49 Mo., 2J1 (1872).
'In re Bulger, 6o Cal., 438 (l88.3); Es parte CoX, 32 Pac. (Idaho),
1971 (i893); In re Fantot:, 55 Neb., 703 (1898).
' Church, "The Writ of Habeas Corpus ;" sec. 373 ('893).
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has paid the one or the other penalty. 6 Similarly Where the
Court adds a 'penalty, of its own motion, to that prescribed
by law. such as the addition of the words "at hard labor,"? the
writ of habeas corpus has been allowed; and always where the
record shows the verdict to have been irregularly rendered,
as by eleven jurors." Generally speaking, however, the courts
are very jealous of this remedy, and it has even been refused
in a case in which a penitentiary sentence was imposed for an
offence punishable only in the county jail, 9 the Supreme Court
of South Carolina declaring this a clear case for a remedy by
appeal. This particular decision would seem to be a questionable one from the standpoint of jurisdiction, but it represents
the extreme reluctance of many courts to permit a collateral
attack upon the judgment of a trial Judge. English courts,
says 'Mr. Church, are particularly conservative in this respect.
There was a strong dissent delivered in e.r parte Burden by
Mr. Justice MAYES, based upon the proposition that the Circuit
Judge was forced to construe an ambiguous verdict, and that
a sentence imposed upon his interpretation thereof, even
though erroneous, could not be assailed in this manner. This
position is sustained by the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of in re, -Eckhart, 166 U. S., 481
(1896), and under the reasoning in that case would seem to be
sound, if we admit the verdict to be ambiguous. But it can
hardly be said that a verdict of "assault and battery with intent
to commit manslaughter" is an equivocal conviction, manslaughter being the form of homicide in which the element of
intent is not found.
The decision of the majority of the court appears to be
sound on principle and in consonance with the authority of
the most carefully considered cases, and constitutes one more
step toward uniformity in the application of the principles of
justice in this somewhat confused domain of the law,

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.

This Act (34 Stat. at L. 232 chap. 3073) was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States in
'In re Bonner, i51 U. S., 242 (1893); U. S. v. Pridgeon, x53 U. S.,
48 (1893).
'Ex parte Kelly, 65 Cal., x54 (1884).
'Scott v. State, 70 Miss., 247 (1892).

'Ex parte Bond, 9 S. Car., So (1877).
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the recent case of Iloward v. Illinois Central Ry. Co. (decided
January 6, i9o8). A majority of the court held that the act applied to intrastate commerce as well as interstate commere, and
based the invalidity of the Act on this ground. Of the justices
concurring in the result of the op~inion delivered by Mr. Justice
WHITE, three were "not prepared to agree with all that is
stated as to the power of Congress to legislate upon the subject of the relations between master and servant"-tese were
the Chief Justice and Justices BRFWER and PECKIAM. The remaining justices affinned the power of Congress to alter the
fellow-servant rule.
The reasoning upon which this power was sustained is found
in the opinion of Mr. Justice VN11rrE and in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice MOODy. The control of Congress
in this matter is derived from the power to "regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the several States and with
the Indian tribes;" and it is asserted that the power is "nothing
less than the whole power which any government can properly
exercise over either" (subject to thegeneral restrictions imposed
by the Constitution). The previous inaction of Congress is
not an implication against the existence of the power, because
the regulation of marine commerce had'until some forty years
ago absorbed the attention of that body. The test of the existence of the power in any given case is not merely the matter
regulated, but whether the regulation of such matter is a regulation of interstate commerce; thus the relation of master
and servant comes within the scope of Congressional regulation,
when that relation directly affects interstate commerce.' The
present subject is within this principle, since it is of primary
importance in the conduct of interstate commerce that regard
should be had for the safety of those engaged therein. Moreover, the power of Congress to regulate the relation of master
and servant in matters directly affecting interstate commerce
is supported by precedent; for in many cases it has been held
that a State could affect this relation under such circumstances
providing Congress had not acted, thus implying that Congress
' Cases are cited showing that the power of Congress to regulate
commerce extends to persons as well as goods.
"Congress may legislate as to the qualifications, duties and liabilities

of employees and others on railway trains engaged in that (interstate)
commerce." Field, J., in Nashville Railway v. Alabama, x28 U. S, 96.
See also statements of Mr. Justice Harlan to effect that Congress could
regulate "the whole subject of the liability of interstate railroad corn-panies for the negligence of those in their service," in Pierce v. Van
Dusen, 78 Fed., 693.
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had the power to act ; and also that the safety-appliance actthe constitutionality of which has been sustained by this court
-is a regulation of the relation of master and servant in connection with the rule of "volcnti non fit injuria."
The second point involved-the decision of which differentiates the majority and minority opinions-is whether the Act
was intended to apply to intrastate as well as interstate commerce. This was the only mooted question, fot it was conceded
by all. that if the Act purported to include intrastate commerce,
that it was unconstitutional. It was, moreover, admitted that
if such was the intent of the Act that the court could not give
the Act a narrower meaning;' nor could the Act be saved in so
far as it applied to the District of Columbia and the Territories,
for the provisions of the Act were "single and incapable of
separation."
The grounds upon which the majority concludes that the
intention of Congress was to embrace intrastate commerce
were: that the words of the first section of the statute clearly
manifested such an intention, in that the Act was to apply to
"every common carrier engaged in trade or commerce in the
District of Columbia. or in any territory of the United States,
or between the several States, etc. ;" and that in defining the
servants to which the Act should extend, the words used are
"any of its employees" (italics not in the statute).
W e pass to the reasoning of the minority opinion. The presumption is in favor of the validity of an act of Congress, and
"every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a
statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond
The enumeration of territorial, interstate
a rational doubt."
and foreign commerce and the omission of the internal commerce of the State. show that Congress was conscious of its
limitations and inteded not to exceed them.5 Regarded from
this standpoint, the words "any of its employees" applies s to
any of its employees while engaged in interstate comnierce.
Several minor points were raised against the unconstitu'Smith v. Ala., z24 U. S., 465.
'Trademark Cases, oo U. S., 8z

' Waite, C. J.. in Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S., 7o0, at p. 71&
'Marshall's, C.J., remarks as to the scope of the interstate commerce
clause are cited as applicable to the construction of this statute. "The
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language * * * must be the exclusively internal
commerce of the state." Gibbon v. Ogden, 9 Wlheaton,

194, 195.

'A striking parallel is made between the present case and the case
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tionality of the statute, which are not passed upon in the
opinion, announcing the decision of the Court, although with
one exception they are summarily lisposei of in the opinion
of M r. Justice Moo y. That exception is the provision of the
statute 'forbidding the employee to make a contract releasing
his employer from the consequences of his negligence." On
this question Mr. Ju.-tice MWooDY des not -pass, but states that,
being a separable provision, the deternination of its validity
cannot affect the decision of the case before him, which arises
under other provisions of the Act:

RECOVERY FOR DAMAGES FOR MENTAL SUFFERING IN TORT AND

IN CONTRACT.

The right to recover for damages for mental suffering, in
actions arising ex delicto and c.r contractu, is a question in the
law concerning which there is a diversity of judicial opinion.*
There is an apparent reluctance to grant recovery in such cases,
due chiefly, perhaps, to the difficulty of definitely ascertaining
2
the true measure of damage from a pecuniary point of view.
In actions arising c.r dclicto the weight of authority is in
favor of a recovery for anguish of mind, but the right is
limited to three well defined classes of cases, viz., first, where
some physical injury has been inflicted;S second, where the
plaintiff has been subjected to personal indignity, as in defamation, malicious prosecution, or seduction ;4 and third, where a
of .fcCullough V. Virginia, 172 U. S., 102. Air. Justice Brewer's language is cited: "However broad and general its (a statute's) language
it cannot be interpreted as extending beyond those matters which it
was within the constitutional power of the Legislature to reach," p.
112.
Note, however, that the statute there referred to was a state
statute. It would seem that such statutes are more leniently treated
than acts of Congress in that the mere fact that on their face they
apply to objects in general, some of which are outside the power of
state control, invadidates them only pro tanto; the explanation, perhaps, is that the Federal Government, in contradistinction to that of
the state, is a government of limited powers.
'See Beaulicu v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 114 N. NV. Rep. .(Minn.),
at p. 353 (Dec. 27, i9o7).

I Ibid., at p. 355.
08 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law, 658; Cent. Dig. (Am. Ed.), vol x5, Col.
1756, sec. ioo.
'8 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law, 668; Cent. Dig. (Am. Ed.), vol. I, Col

x756, sec. ioo.
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clear legal right of the plaintiff has been invaded in such a
wilful or malicious :nanner as would naturally cause mental
distress. regardless of the preceding elements of physical injury
or per.onal indignity.5 It does not follow, however, that this
is a proper element of (lamage in all tort actions, and it has
been held that there could be no recovery for mental suffering
which resulted to a mother from the death of a child by a
wrongful act;' nor for libeling the dead ;7nor for mere fright
resulting in a nervous disorder ;S nor for anxiety for safety of
one's self or family during a blasting operation;' nor from
threats or duress by means of which property was unlawfully
procured.' 0 The better rule would seem to be that recovery
for mental pain in this class of cases is restricted to those in
which there is an accompanying invasion of a legal right, physical bodily injury, malice, insult or inhumanity."1
As a general rule, pain of mind is not a subject of damages
in actions arising ex contracti, except where the breach of a
contract amounts in substance to an independent, wilful tort. 2
Exceptions to the general rule are actions for breach of promise
to marry, 3 and actions against carriers for wilful or malicious
injuries to passengers, in violation of their contract to carry
safely.' 4 The great weight of authority is against a recovery
for mental suffering through failure to deliver telegrams."
Some courts, however, hold contra, in accordance with the socalled "Texas doctrine." 16 Where this doctrine has been followed it has been adhered to consistently, and an extreme case
is found in North Carolina,"- where recovery was allowed for
fright and worry incident to a father's failure to meet his
young daughter at a railroad station, because of the non'Lesch v. Railway Co., 97 Minn., 503 (i9o6).
' State, Coughlan v. Railway Co., 24 Md., 84 (x86$).
'Bradt v. New Nonpareil Co., io8 Iowa, 449 (18gg).
'Porter v. D. L. & IV. R. R. Co., 73 N. J. Law, 405- (igo6).
SW'yman v. Leavitt, 71 Me., 227 (IS8o).
" Il'ulstein v. Mohinan, 57 N. Y. Super. Ct., 5o (i889).
"Morse v. Duncan, 14 Fed. Rep. (C. C.), 396 (i89o).
2 See Beaulieu v. Great Northern Railway Co., supra, at pp. 354, 355;
WJ'ilco.r v. R. R. Co., 8 U. S. App., i18 (1892).
"Coil v. Wallace, 24 N. J. Law, 291 (1854).
Craker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis., 657 (1875).
" See Beaulieu v. Great Northern Railway Co., supra, at p. 354.
"Ibid., at p. 355; Cent. Dig. (Am. Ed.), vol. i5,Cot-1759, sec. io5.
"Green v. Telegraph Co., 136 N. Car., 5o6 (19o4).
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delivery of a telegram advising him of her arrival there at a
scheduled hour, and the terror which ensued during a lonely
ride at midiight to her home.
Recovery has also been allowed for mental pain resulting
from the mutilation of a dead body ;"6 from the breach of contract to carry a dead body safely, where such breach constituted a wilful tort;"' and from the breach of contract of an
undertaker to keep safely the body of a dead child.2 0 The
Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, has recently refused
a recovery for mental distress where a railroad company negligently failed to carry a dead body to its destination according
to the usual train schedule, the delay interfering with the
funeral plans and causing anxiety, humiliation and other anguish of mind.21 The case holds that the facts establish a
breach of contract only, and in the absence of a wilful tort
incident to such breach, mental suffering is not an element of
damage. It would seem to be in exact accord with the general
rule, and commends itself to the legal mind as a sound view
of the question involved. The subject is thoroughly reviewed,
and the authorities fully stated, in the opinion of the Court.

THE SCOPE OF THE REMEDY OF

DiscoVERY.

The usefulness of a bill of discovery in eliciting evidence to
forward the ends of justice and render more difficult the
successful perpetration of fraud is illustrated in a case recently
decided by the United States Circuit Court for the District of
Kansas. The case is that of the lutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Griesa et al., 156 Fed. 398. One Perkins, who had taken out a policy with the complainant company for $ioo,ooo, in addition to several other policies aggregating nearly a million dollars with other companies, had been
killed by accidentally falling from the roof of his house,
shortly after having paid the first premium on the policy. The
circumstances accompanying the accident were highly suspicious, poir'ing to a deliberate suicide; irideed, the coroner
thought that such was the case. Perkins had purchased mor" Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn, 37 (xsg).
" Lindh v. Railway Co., 99 Minn., 4o8 (x9o6).
'Renhan v. Wright, 125 Ind., 536 (.ISO).
'Beaulieu v. Great Northern Ry. Co., ,upra.

-NOTES

phine the day of his death; his eyes showed effects of morphine poisoning; and the doctor who examined him hinted at
such a cause. He was, however, buried without any examination having been made on the part of the insurance companies. There was a clause in complainant's policy which
prevented recovery if death occurred through suicide within
two years from the payment of the first premium; a clause to
which Perkins had strongly objected, but which he had finally
accepted under protest. Vhen action was brought against the
complainant for the insurance, this bill was filed petitioning
the court to grant an order to have the corpse exhumed and
examined by physicians for traces of morphine poisoning.
Mr. Justice McPherson granted the order, reviewing the
authorities with care, and announcing that in such a case,
where the ends of justice required it, and where a possible
fraud was to be guarded against, no questions of delicacy
should enter into the case; adding dryly that such arguments
certainly would not have been advanced had it been necessary
to take such a proceeding for the executor to obtain the money.
The case is a novel one in the length to which it goes,
though by no means and illogical conclusion, considering the
development of the usefulness of this form of relief during the
past century. Originally, as is well known, the bill of discovery
lay only when books or documents material to the cause were
wholly in the control of one of the parties, and the other
could show the court that the evidence they contained was
a necessary link in the framing of his action."
There soon arose analogous cases, however, in which this
form of producing evidence was the only adequate one. "In
chancery, under the same wholesome principle and practice by
which bills of discovery were allowed for ascertaining the
opponent's testimony and the documents in his possession, the
inspection of chattels and premises in his possession or control was obtainable wherever fairness seemed to demand it."s
Hence we find Lord Eldon allowing the bill in i8i, where an
injunction was asked for to restrain the infringement of a
patent, and the inspection desired was of the machine in which
the alleged piracy was worked out;8 and again, in i819, in the
case of Kynaston v. The East India Co., 3 Swanston 248, where
the petition asked for an order of inspection of certain houses

'Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. igr.
23 Wigmore's Evidence, See. x86z.
'Bovill .Moore, 2 Cooper's Chan. cascs 56 (i&5).
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in order to determine the value of the titles to which the
plaintiff was entitled.
The examination has been most frequently allowed, both in
England and the United States, in mining cases, where there
was a dispute as to the boundary, or as to the amount of
mineral extracted from the plaintiff's mine by the adjoining
In Reyntolds v. Burgess
owner, and a survey was desired.
Sulphile Fibre Co., 71 N. H. 332 (go2), Judge Chase, of the
Supreme Court of New Hanip.,hire. in a well-reasoned opinion,
allows the bill where an inspection of a machine is asked by the
administratrix of a workman who was killed by reason of a
defect in it, the principal action being one in tort for the
death. Cases in some jurisdictions have gone the other way,
notably in New York,5 where the Code 1ractice seems to be
an obstacle, and in Michigan,6 where the order was refused;
in each case, however, upon some other than the jurisdictional
ground. But the general law in this country, as well as in
England, seems to be that a bill of discovery will be allowed
where the evidence sought is contained in property within the
defendant's control, whether that property be books, documents, chattels or real estate. All that the plaintiff need
show is a definite interest, an interest which, in the language
of Story (Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. i493a) "will, if he is
plaintiff at law, constitute a good ground of action, or, if he is
the defendant at law, show a good ground of defense, in aid
of which the discovery is sought." And in cases of doubt,
he adds, the court will grant the discovery, and leave the
court of law to adjudicate upon the legal rights of the parties.
There is considerable conflict as to whether discovery should
be allowed in one class of cases: those in which it is soughi
to compel a witness to permit his person to be examined,
in order to determine the extent of an injury. The Supreme
Court of the United States. in Union Pacific R. R. v. Botsford,
141 U. S., 25o (189o), refused to grant such an order, holding
it a violation of the natural right of every man to the inviolability of his person," though later, in a case brought in a
jurisdiction where a statute provided for such examination,
they admitted that the Federal Courts should recognize the
'Henszcy v. Langdon-Ilcnszey Coal .lin. Co., So Fed. 178 (1897);
Stockbridge Iron Co.v. Cone Iron Iorfks. io2 Mass. % ( W69); Thomas
Iron Co. v. l4lentozen Mining Co., 28 N. J., Eq. 77 (1877).
*Ansen v. Tuska. i Robertson (X. Y), 663 (1863).

'Newberry v. Carpenter, 31 L R. A. 163 (1g895); Martin v. Elliott,
31 L R. A. 169 (1895).
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statute.t The very existence of such legislation would indicate
that the tendency of the law is to compel a party to submit
to such inspection, or else forfeit his right to the benefit of the
law, and such seems to be the case.'
The writer has succeeded in finding only one other case in
which the bill was brought for the same purpose as in the
Insurance Co. v. Griesa. That is the case of the Grangers'Life
Insurance Co. v. Broen, 57 .Miss. 308 (1829), in which the
court refused the order on the ground that the facts were
not strong enough to warrant it. "We are not prepared to
say," the opinion reads, "that in a proper case the court, in the
interests of justice, should not compel the exhuming and examination of a dead body which is under the control of the
plaintiff, if there is a strong reason to believe that without such
examination a fraud is likely to be accomplished, and the
defendant has exhausted every other method known to the law
of exposing it. We are prepared to say, however, that such a
order should be made only upon a strong showing to that
effect."
Under the facts as shown in the report there was as much
reason to grant the bill here as in the Griesa case, and the
failure of the court to do so can only be explained by the
fact, as shown by the portion of the opinion quoted, that the
principle that discovery may be cumulative is not recognized.
It is true that there was a time when the auxiliary bill of
discovery was constantly and often needlessly presented, as an
easy means of obtaining valuable evidence, and hence the
United States Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Swann, IO
Peters, 497 (1836), denying the bill where the facts may be
proved in any other way. But the practice has changed so
materially that this rule is no longer necessary, and Brown v.
Swann may be said not to represent the general law.* Discovery will not be refused because the same facts can be
proved by other testimony. but discovery will be granted in
order to confirm or even to dispense with such other proofs.' 0
The authorities seems to present no valid reason why such
a case as this should not have been decided long ago. Indeed,
GCamden & Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U. S. 172 (1899).
'Dimenstein v. Reichelson, 34 W. N. C. (Pa.) 295 (i9o3); Graves v.
Battle Creek, 95 Mich. 266.
'Earl of Glcngall v. Frazer, 2 Hare, 99; Peck v. Ashley, to Met.
(Mass.) 478; Vance v. AndrctUs, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.), 370, 2 Story
Equity, Sec. 1483. Pomeroy, Equity Sec. i96.
Merwin, Equity and Equity Pleading, Sec. 854.
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aside from the question of delicacy, which has doubtless oftentimes stopped the proceeding in its inception, the groumns for
denying the bill are slighter here than elsewhere, for such
refusal is most frequently based on the argument that to
grant discovery would be to violate a property right, and no
one has a property right in a buried corpse.1 2 The decision is
an interesting one, particularly in the light of the recent proceedings in England in the matter of the Druce succession.
2
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